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Chapter 3 
Out in ‘The Open’ with Georges Braque and Saint-John Perse: 
 L’Ordre des oiseaux 
 
Neil Cox 
 
What birds plunge through is not the intimate space 
in which you see all forms intensified. 
(Out in the Open, you would be denied 
your self, would disappear into that vastness.)1 
 
The French poet Saint-John Perse was first introduced to the painter Georges Braque 
on 26 November 1958 in the artist’s Paris studio. This was three years after the 
German philosopher Martin Heidegger had made a special trip to see Braque at his 
home and studio in Varengeville, Normandy, in the company of Jean Beaufret. It was 
the latter meeting, recorded in a photograph that I find faintly comic (fig. 3.1) and that 
first set me thinking about the possible relationships between these two moderns, the 
philosopher and the artist. This chapter develops an essay in which I identified 
resonances between Heidegger’s thinking and Braque’s painting. My aim is to 
question the bringing together of two life-long projects that were realized in different 
                                                 
1 From an uncollected poem by Rainer Maria Rilke, written in Muzot, 16 June 1924, and translated in Rilke, Ahead 
of all Parting, The Selected Poetry and Prose of Rainer Maria Rilke, (trans.) Stephen Mitchell (New York, 1995, 
p.173). This essay is a revised version of a paper presented at the 36th Annual Conference of the Association of Art 
Historians, University of Glasgow, 15–17th April 2010. I am very grateful to Amanda Boetzkes and Aron Vinegar 
for inviting me to participate in their session on ‘Heidegger and the Work of Art History’, and to the audience, in 
particular Diamuid Costello and Phillip Tonner, for their comments. 
  
63
cultural spheres and in different forms.2 Writing mostly about Braque’s remarkable 
Studio series of the early 1950s (e.g. Atelier VI, Fondation Maeght, St Paul de Vence), 
I tried, in my earlier essay, to read their dense and complex surfaces in relation to 
Heidegger’s descriptions of ‘the ontological difference’ between Being and beings. 
This difference, in brief, is between what Heidegger terms an ‘unconcealing’ or 
disclosure (the un- or the dis- that opens up, that allows every thing that is to appear, to 
be present) and the concealing or closure that is its presencing, the ground of grounds. 
Sometimes Heidegger expresses this difference in terms of the way light makes things 
emerge for us out of the dark, where the lightening of things makes things themselves 
seem all that there is, and where the darkness around them, which metaphorically 
speaking is like the concealing or closure that is Being, recedes from our everyday 
attention. To make the basis of the translation from existential phenomenology to 
modern painting viable, I played with Heidegger’s metaphorical and eminently visual 
language of the seeming positivity of things and the elusive negative of space, a 
struggle between, and co-dependence of, light and shadow in beings which is a clue to 
the meaning of Being. I tried to draw the two projects together in the terrain of poetry. 
Neither was a poet, but both in their later years privileged poetry, or the making that is 
poeticizing, as a form of thinking: Heidegger for its potential to point to the truth of 
Being anew at what he believed was the darkest hour for humanity; Braque for its 
ability to free the mind from objects, to draw attention instead to their relations, the 
‘in-between’.3 In passing from beings (or ‘objects’) to the medium of their being (here 
their ‘relations’), which in Braque’s painting is the ground – ground as ‘space’ but 
also, perhaps, as the act of painting – the felicitous point of comparison is that in the 
                                                 
2 Neil Cox, ‘Braque and Heidegger on the Way to Poetry’, Angelaki: A Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, 12/2 
(August 2007): pp. 97–115. 
3 Cox, ‘Braque and Heidegger’, p. 111. 
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visual arts Braque was thinking beyond a representational structure that is arguably the 
conceptual equivalent of the one that, in the history of philosophy, Heidegger 
identified as the error of Western metaphysics.4 
In discussing this notion of the poetic, or better poeticizing, in Braque’s work, 
there persists in my mind a doubt around the bird representations in the Studios and 
other paintings of his late career. I am troubled by the degree to which these avian 
intercessors could be considered as consistent with some of the Heideggerean claims I 
have tried to make for Braque’s art. If, as argued in my earlier paper, this art can be 
viewed in its own way as an interrogation of the question of being, Braque’s birds 
seem to introduce a privileging of creatures as figures of ontological omniscience, 
something akin to the ‘uncanny hominization’ that Heidegger uncovered and rejected 
in the poetry of Rainer Maria Rilke. This chapter is, therefore, an investigation into the 
nature of Braque’s bird representations, a questioning of them in relation to 
Heidegger’s critique of Rilke. 
I shall begin by focusing on a very late enterprise in Braque’s career, a 
collaborative publication with the diplomat and prose-poet Alexis Leger (1887–1975), 
whose pen name was Saint-John Perse. This unusual artist’s book, consisting of 
Perse’s text Birds and Braque’s twelve prints carrying the different title The Order of 
the Birds, was instigated by publishers Francis and Janine Crémieux, and was to be 
                                                 
4 There are, of course, holes that might be picked in this claim from the perspective of Heidegger’s thinking. For 
example, take two opposing points drawn from the Parmenides lectures: Being is not the ground but is groundless 
(Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, trans. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington, 1992), p.150), 
making any reading of the ground in painting as a metaphor for Being problematic. Meanwhile, Heidegger’s 
description of the error of man in the face of beings chimes well with Braque’s critical notion that we must resist the 
European tradition of oil painting with its preoccupation with the surfaces of volumes of objects and attend instead 
to what is in-between them: ‘Because only unconcealed beings can appear and do appear in the open of Being, man 
adheres, at first unwittingly, and then constantly, to these beings.’ (Ibid., p.151). 
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both a celebration of the artist’s eightieth birthday and the centrepiece of an exhibition 
in the Bibliothèque nationale de France, highlighting the dialogue between celebrated 
poet and painter.5 Perse, a newly crowned Nobel Laureate, had long before this made 
birds a motif in his poetry, starting with his poem ‘Cohorte’ of 1907, and had 
developed the theme in one of the volumes he published while living in the United 
States, Vents (Winds) of 1946. At the point of being asked to collaborate with Braque, 
he was contemplating a long poem on the subject.6  
At that first meeting of 1958, Perse recalled seeing on the various easels in 
Braque’s studio a painting of a plough and one of a bird (a studio photograph taken 
five years later by Mariette Lachaud gives a feel for the kind of scene that greeted 
Perse (fig. 3.2)). On the easels are a large painting called In Full Flight (1956–61), to 
which I shall return, and The Large Plough (1960). Perse also knew, of course, 
Braque’s high profile decorative scheme for the Etruscan rooms of the Musée du 
Louvre completed in 1954, a major event in French national commissioning that gave 
a living artist the chance to work in spaces hitherto only dedicated to the presentation 
of the old masters, decorative arts of the past, and ancient cultural heritage. In 
Braque’s Louvre ceiling canvases, vast schematic birds wheeled abstract shapes 
                                                 
5 Saint-John Perse, L’ordre des oiseaux, with 12 colour etchings by Georges Braque, Paris: Au Vent d’Arles, 1962. 
For the text see also Perse, Oiseaux (Paris, 1963). For an early commentary see Victor Bromery, ‘Perse’s Avian 
Order’, The Hudson Review, 19/3 (Autumn, 1966): pp. 494–97, and for a discussion of the project in the context of 
the poet’s wider interest in art throughout his career, see Roger Little, ‘Saint-John Perse et les arts visuels’, Revue 
d’histoire littéraire de la France, Vol.82, No.2, (1986), pp. 220–34, especially p.227–8. Carol Rigolet argues that 
the inspiration for Perse’s text is more about Audobon as Braque (Rigolet, Forged Genealogies: Saint-John Perse’s 
conversations with culture, Department of Romance Languages: The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 
2001, Chapter 11, especially pp.188–90). 
6 See Mechtild Cranston, ‘Voice and Vision, Cry Gesture: The Birds of Saint-John Perse’ Symposium, 32:2 
(Summer 1978): pp. 103–13, for more on the 1907 poem. 
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among weighty decorative mouldings. Braque resorted to comparably simplified forms 
and strong patterns in the twelve prints that formed the visual dimension of The Order 
of the Birds (fig. 3.3). 
The best prints are remarkable for their exploration of the page as a dynamic 
field, a free space in contrast to the rigours imposed by the presentation of text. 
Moreover, they are technically astounding: etchings in up to five colours, made with 
the master printer Aldo Crommelynck, using heavy handmade paper and thick inks. 
Yet what really marks them out is the degree to which they abandon the natural 
linearity of etching in favour of blocks of colour, texture, and pattern to the point 
where they emulate the effects of Braque’s own paintings, creating a balance between 
the birds and the space around them (fig. 3.4).7  
Perse’s hybrid text is part meditation on birds as the most vital of beings, part 
figuring of poetic vision through the image of the bird in flight, and part reflection on 
Braque’s representations of birds as themselves poetic.8 Divided into thirteen short 
sections, the text moves more or less seamlessly between these different strands. In 
terms of the first theme, birds in their vitality, Perse makes much of the world in which 
he imagines that birds exist: a world of endless flight, one subject to gravity but 
defying it, one of an unimaginable dynamism and erotic intensity. Section I establishes 
Perse’s characteristic stance: the lyrical description of birds, bringing them into a 
relationship, albeit of extreme distance, with the human world: ‘Birds, of all our table 
                                                 
7 See Jennifer Mundy, Georges Braque: Printmaker (London, 1993), p. 32. For more on the technical aspects of the 
project see Dora Vallier, Braque: The Complete Graphics, Catalogue Raisonné, (trans.) Robert Bononno and 
Pamela Barr (New York/ London, 1988), p. 255. 
8 Its hybridity has been the cause of its limited critical reception: see Shushi Kao, ‘Une Poétique des Figures: 
Oiseaux de Saint-John Perse’, Neophilologus, 69:3 (July 1985), pp. 352–64, especially p. 352. 
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companions the hungriest for life, nourish their rage with a secret fever in the veins; 
theirs is the grace of body heat’.9 
From a Heideggerean perspective, and for reasons that will become apparent 
below, this is already perhaps a poetry that stands in need of the test of thought. If so it 
is in Section X, in particular, where the questioning must begin, for here Perse 
attributes to birds a special relationship to what Heidegger’s translators capitalize as 
Being: ‘Midway between earth and sky, the upstream and downstream of eternity, 
precursors marking out an eternal course, they are our intermediaries, straining with all 
their being to the farthest reach of being’.10 The assertion that birds might have some 
privileged relationship to ontological truths is, Heidegger would think, deeply 
problematic. Nevertheless, before exposing this claim to the criticisms that Heidegger 
makes of Rilke, it is important to note that one of the challenges in reading Perse’s text 
is to be sensitive to the movement back and forth between Perse’s own encomia to 
birds and his approaches to Braque’s bird representations. The passage from one to the 
other is often marked out after the fact, so that in the extract from Section X just cited, 
which reads as a philosophical claim about the proximity of birds to Being, it becomes 
apparent in the beginning of the following section that the topic all along was probably 
the birds depicted in Braque’s art. There is a clue to this a few sentences before in 
section X: ‘The farther they glide the more fully they know the joy of being, these 
birds with their ancient history and aspiration, their heads like dolphins or new-born 
children’.11 The dolphin and infant heads are, I think, ways of addressing the extreme 
abstraction of some of the creatures in Braque’s prints for the volume.12 
                                                 
9 Saint-John Perse, Birds, (trans.) Robert Fitzgerald, with four colour etchings by Georges Braque (New York, 
1966), also translated as Birds, (trans.) Derek Mahon (Loughcrew, Co. Meath, 2002), p. 11. 
10 Ibid., p. 27. 
11 Ibid., p. 26. 
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Of course, the fact that the poetic imagination may be playing upon represented 
rather than real birds, that Perse might be inspired to find ontological truths in the 
strange forms of Braque’s prints, might only reinforce the problem that was my point 
of departure. The poet’s lyric voice may have over-reached itself as metaphysics 
because Braque’s own avian visualizations are equally prone to the same error. Perse’s 
nearly imperceptible shifting from one register to another, from the discussion of the 
birds of natural science to those of art, from those of the poets to those of the 
Ornithological Station at the Camargue on the coast of Provence repeatedly associates 
the ‘joy of being’ with Braque’s ornithology. Furthermore, I think it would be fair to 
say that many of Braque’s bird paintings of the mid-1950s onwards, ones like The Nest 
in the Foliage (1958) that emerged, so to speak, out of the Studio series, attest to a 
mystical contemplation of avian life-worlds. The question is whether or not Braque 
makes the bird into a figure whose relation to Being is superior to any such human 
relationship. 
In order to think through this claim, I now want to attend more closely to the 
terms of Heidegger’s critique of Rilke. Heidegger discussed the key text, Rilke’s 
‘Eighth Elegy’, published as one of the ten Duino Elegies in 1923, on a number of 
occasions. His approach to the poem was, as many have noted, a development of the 
ontological distinctions he had drawn between different kinds of beings in his lecture 
course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics of 1929–30. In this formidable 
work, Heidegger explored a tri-partite definition of beings: a stone is treated as 
‘worldless’, an animal as ‘poor in world’, and human beings as ‘World-forming’.13 
                                                                                                                                             
12 And their ‘ancient history’ now makes sense as the ancient history of bird representations listed by Perse 
elsewhere; inheritance from Persian and Egyptian sculpture, from the Qu’ran, from Audobon. 
13 Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William McNeill 
and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington/Indianapolis, 1995), p. 177. 
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Most of the argument is focused on defining what, for the animal, ‘poverty in world’ 
might mean, and broadly speaking Heidegger defines this in terms of an instinctual 
‘captivation’, a set of relationships to things in the environment of the animal, its circle 
of activity, where there is no possibility of relating to beings as beings, but merely of 
being open to being taken, or ‘captured’, by them. This being open is contrasted with 
the openness of human beings to beings as beings, where beings are not merely open 
but open-able, unconcealed beings.14 If the stone has no possibility of any kind of 
opening to other beings, the animal is open to captivation by beings but at the same 
time deprived of having a world where beings could be revealed to it.  
Heidegger takes up this sense of an unbridgeable gulf between animal and 
human being in his first sustained discussion of Rilke’s ‘Elegy’, at the very end of his 
Parmenides lecture course of 1942–3. His objective here is to define the word ‘open’ 
for his own purposes, as a way of thinking Being as the groundlessness out of which 
all grounds must appear. ‘The open,’ he writes, ‘to which every being is liberated as if 
to its freedom, is Being itself. Every thing unconcealed is as such secured in the open 
of being, i.e. in the groundless’.15 Crucially, this open is a bestowal upon man, as the 
being who can acknowledge unconcealedness as the truth of Being; only man can see 
the open, even if, historically, that seeing is often forgotten or lost, hidden behind the 
plethora of beings. It is against this set of pronouncements that Heidegger takes Rilke 
to task.16 A reading of the first lines of the ‘Eighth Elegy’ will make the problem 
obvious: 
                                                 
14 Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, (trans.) Keith Attell, (Stanford, 2004), p. 55. 
15 Heidegger, Parmenides, p. 150. 
16 Most commentators on Heidegger’s engagement with Rilke focus on the stringent critique of the Parmenides 
course. But there is a further, much more lengthy and in my view much more balanced discussion of Rilke’s notion 
of ‘the Open’ and his understanding of the situation of man in modernity, in the 1946 occasional essay ‘Why 
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With all its eyes the creature-world beholds 
the Open. But our eyes, as though reversed,  
encircle it on every side, like traps 
set round its unobstructed path to freedom. 
What is outside, we know from the brute’s face 
alone; for while a child’s quite small we take it 
and turn it around and force it to look backwards 
at conformation, not that openness 
so deep within the brute’s face. Free from death. 
We alone see that; the free animal 
has its decease perpetually behind it 
and God in front, and when it moves, it moves 
within eternity, like running springs. 
We’ve never, no, not for one single day, 
pure space before us, such as that which flowers 
endlessly open into: always world, 
and never nowhere without the no...17 
 
Rilke sees creatures, the animal, as closer than man to everything that is, to all 
beings, thanks to the existence of the creature in ‘the Open’, to being so entirely 
embedded in the wide circle of things as to be one with it. Heidegger glosses what 
                                                                                                                                             
Poets?’ To my mind, there is something extraordinary about Heidegger’s way of engaging with poetry in this piece, 
an approach that is both remarkably discursive and grounded in close reading. Whereas the Parmenides lectures 
were unforgiving in their assessment of poetic achievement according to the degree to which a poem can be said to  
‘attain the mountain height of a historically foundational decision’ (Parmenides, p.160), poeticising in Rilke is here 
given its due.  
17 Rilke, ‘The Eighth Elegy’, The Duino Elegies, trans. J. B. Leishman and Stephen Spender, (London, 1963) 
[Fourth Edition], p.77. I have capitalised the ‘O’ of Open in this translation, for consistency with other translations 
and for clarity in relation to Heidegger’s term. 
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Rilke means by the Open as ‘…the limitless, the infinite, wherein living beings breath 
and unrestrainedly dissolve into the irresistible causal nexuses of nature, in order to 
float within this infinity’.18 As we now know, for Heidegger, by contrast, only human 
beings could ever grasp the open, since only in a rich form of world, and with the 
bestowal of language, would it be possible to grasp beings as beings, and thus to ask 
the question of Being at all, to be struck by Being. Heidegger insists that animal seeing 
cannot be construed as a seeing of the open of Being. He explains: 
Plant and animal are suspended in something outside themselves without ever being able to 
‘see’ either the outside or the inside. And never would it be possible for a stone, no more than 
for an airplane, to elevate itself toward the sun in jubilation and to move like a lark, which 
nevertheless does not see the open.19 
To return to Perse, I think it is plausible to see strong parallels between his meditation 
on birds in L’Ordre des oiseaux and Rilke’s vision of the animal as freely gazing into 
the Open, contrasted in both their poetics with the closing off of the Open to human 
eyes. Take, for example, the following from Perse’s Section XIII: 
Together with everything else that wanders the world, adrift on the flow of time, they go where 
all the world’s birds go, to the fate of all earthly creatures; to surge where everything goes, the 
celestial circuits themselves, that immense heave of life and creation which moves the spring 
night to its depths, rounding more capes than our dreams can erect; and so vanish, leaving us to 
the ocean of things free and unfree.20 
This ocean of things that are visible to us is a mere residue, Perse implies, 
compared to the infinite of the bird’s temporal immersion. And again, some of 
Braque’s works of the same period, such as the painting In Full Flight (fig. 3.5) 
showing a jet-like bird, meant by the artist to be seen from above flying over its 
                                                 
18 Heidegger, Parmenides, p.157. 
19 Ibid., p.160. 
20 Perse, (trans.) Mahon, p. 32. 
  
72
waterborne nest, abstracted to become the black shape on the right, could be thought to 
express that same infinite celestial notion, that sublimity of avian flight that takes the 
bird out into Rilke’s Open. The bird in The Bird in its Nest (fig. 3.6) is captivated in its 
environment, no doubt; building its nest; tending its eggs; seeking food on the wing.  
Another resonance between the two poetic discourses is evident in the attitude 
that Perse and Rilke take to modernity. The Open contrasts in Rilke’s thinking, 
Heidegger argues, with the modern conception of the instrumental reasoning of man. 
Beings are ordered, mastered, possessed, and manipulated by modern man, who is the 
viewing, representing, reasoning subject over against a world thus made up of 
‘objects’.  
And we: spectators always, everywhere, 
looking at, never out of, everything! 
It fills us. We arrange it. It collapses. 
We re-arrange it, and collapse ourselves.21 
 
This representational consciousness is pejoratively named ‘metaphysics’ by Heidegger 
in virtue of its occupation with beings and forgetting of Being. In its substance it posits 
man as a rational animal, as a calculating, reasoning creature. For Rilke, and here 
Heidegger agrees, this instrumental reasoning is oblivion. But for Rilke what must be 
recovered instead by way of healing (but cannot be by way of representational 
consciousness) is man’s animal relationship to the Open. Rilke therefore argues 
instead for a different consciousness, one founded in a poetic language that can speak 
the inner world of the heart. Heidegger views this solution as persisting in 
metaphysical error, still clinging to the nefarious and fundamentally alienated notion 
of the human subject in its preoccupation with the inner voice, still trapped in a 
                                                 
21 Rilke, The Duino Elegies, p. 81. 
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Cartesian view of man as part animal, part reason. This sense of the inner voice of the 
heart is evident in Perse too: ‘Ignoring their own shadows, knowing of death only the 
immortality implicit in the noise of distant waters, they vanish, they leave us, their 
lonely thoughts traversing space, and we are changed forever.’22 Rilke’s animals, too, 
know nothing of death (‘Only we see that’). And like Rilke’s man, turned back on 
beings as objects, arranging and rearranging them and his own self, Perse’s human 
observers are left to an ocean of things. Crucially, though, and again this chimes with 
Rilke, Perse is somehow changed or elated by the flight of the bird into infinite 
openness. We hear an echo of Rilke’s lyrical exhortation: ‘You must change your 
life!’23 
Heidegger may have condemned Rilke as the poetic counterpart of Nietzsche – 
both announcing and enacting the dénouement of Western metaphysical thinking – but 
he also lauded Rilke’s attention to the saving power of poetic language, this 
interrogation of poetry within poetry as a means to finding again what, according to 
Heidegger, Rilke wrongly thought as the limitless freedom of the Open. At least, he 
argued, Rilke grasped that language was the space in which the Open could be said 
anew. Perse’s voice is also lyrical in this way, a surging or saying of the inner world of 
the subject confronted by the Rilkean Open of the creature. Again, such saying points 
to a need for the thinking of beings as beings, even if it cannot do this work itself. 
Might this poetic saying, then, be an approach to Braque’s birds? 
Poetry is making in language, but of course when we turn to Braque’s painterly 
prints we deal with depiction. So, if a critical analogy is to work we need to consider 
                                                 
22 Perse, (trans.) Mahon, p. 32. 
23 This is the last line of Rilke’s well-known poem ‘Archaic Torso of Apollo’. For a brilliant discussion of the 
heterodox nature of Rilke’s writing see Michael Wood, ‘His affairs with women were intense, literary and 
dominated by the word “soul”’, London Review of Books, vol.18, no.16, pp. 8–9. 
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whether there could be a Heideggerean approach to the ‘interrogation of painting 
within painting’ that is also a staging of the question of the Open, and therefore a route 
to thinking about their ‘ontological difference’, at a time when modernity threatens its 
oblivion. Certainly, that there could be an analogous approach in terms of 
Heideggerean critique is made plausible thanks to Braque’s notion of his art as 
fundamentally poetic, though it remains to consider the particular character of 
painting’s ‘saying’.  
To put the point another way, what, in The Bird in its Nest, are to we to make 
of Braque’s means? Here the free Open of flight is dense, clotted, and dark. If the 
project of speaking the ‘inner voice of the heart’ is a way of thinking Braque’s animal 
representations, then what voice is he inviting us to hear when he transforms the studio 
bird into this captivated but mystical creature? 
Around the time of the publication of L’Ordre des oiseaux, Braque described 
his 1955 visit to the Camargue in terms that demonstrate that we should not make a 
literal equation between the visions in his prints and Perse’s later poetic metaphysics, 
but which do provide a conception of ‘poetic saying’ in painting. Braque describes the 
impact of seeing cranes, pelicans or flamingos in flight: 
One summer, a few years ago, I was in the Camargue. I saw some huge birds flying above the 
waters. From that vision I derived aerial forms. Birds have inspired me, and I try to make the 
best use of them that I can in my paintings. While they interest me as living animal species, I 
have to bury in my memory their natural functions as birds. This concept, even after the shock 
of inspiration which has brought them to life in my mind, must be deleted, so that I can draw 
closer to my essential preoccupation: the construction of pictorial fact. Painting alone must 
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impose its presence on what relates to it, and metamorphose it afresh; everything that goes to 
make up the picture must be integrated in this presence, and must efface itself before it.24 
The artist insists here on the precedence of pictorial making over the surprise afforded 
by the sight of birds in the wild. If Perse is right to see in Braque’s birds freed into 
painting an image of ‘the joy of being’, according to the artist the metamorphosis that 
he effects must be understood as the making present in painting of the ‘shock of 
inspiration’ that aerial forms, flying birds, first gave. In this case, although birds are 
figured in prints and paintings, their now schematic forms in flight are intended to act 
as the key to a fundamentally modernist concept, the vectors of pictorial space, rather 
in the way that Constantin Brancusi’s extraordinary Bird in Space (1923) had done for 
sculptural space. Both Braque and Brancusi are modernists because they are doing 
exactly what Heidegger thinks Rilke was doing in his poetic saying: interrogating their 
means through those very means. Heidegger inflects for us what could seem an arid 
formalism, of the kind normally associated with the later writings of Clement 
Greenberg, with the deepest existential questions that face humanity in modernity: 
what kind of relationship to our world can we have in the era of advanced technology? 
Very late in life, in 1970 or so, Heidegger took to writing somewhat 
indigestible poems of his own, including one on the subject of Cézanne, an artist 
whose work he held particularly dear. This poem contains a peculiar trap for 
interpretation: 
In the late work of the painter the twofoldness of what is present and of presence has become 
one, ‘realized’ and overcome at the same time, transformed into a mystery filled identity.25 
                                                 
24 Braque, cited by Jacques Damase in 1963, Quoted in Mundy, p. 32. Braque visited the Ornithological Park in The 
Camargue on 20 May 1955 (see Les Oiseaux et l’oeuvre de Saint-John Perse, (exh. cat.) Hôtel de Ville, Aix-en-
Provence and Musée Jacquemart-André, Paris, 19 June 1976–January 1977), p. 127. 
25 Cited in Julian Young, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art (Cambridge, 2001), p. 152. I am very grateful to my Essex 
colleague and Heidegger specialist Wayne Martin, whose criticisms enabled me to see the problem here. 
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The trap is, of course, that in terms of Heidegger’s whole philosophical project, the 
notion that one could overcome the twofoldness of beings and Being seems wrong-
headed. On the contrary, Heidegger insists over and over again in his writings on the 
need to attend to the ontological difference, to grasp that Being is not a being and that 
presence is a self-withdrawal that makes the positive self-disclosing of beings possible. 
As if to confirm the oddness, Heidegger explained his poem: he said that what 
Cézanne’s art embodied was ‘for thinking, the question of overcoming the ontological 
difference between Being and beings’.26 
Unless we attribute this sudden volte-face regarding overcoming of the 
ontological difference to a lapse of concentration in old age, it seems that we need to 
attend to the context of the remark more carefully. And I think that doing so will 
enable us to grasp something of the way Heidegger understood painting and its 
possibilities judged from the perspective of the questioning of Being. In the same gloss 
on the poem, Heidegger claims that the oneness ‘realized’ in Cézanne’s works is ‘the 
oneness of the pure radiance of his paintings’.27 Here Heidegger reveals a particular 
understanding of Cézanne’s art, one based on the notion that in the medium of painting 
it was possible to construct a procedure where the manifestation of things (of beings) 
in the representation was so inseparable from the manifestation of the medium itself 
(Being) that the two things could be said to manifest as a unity, a pictorial metaphor, 
perhaps, for the striking experience of the given-ness of what is present in the clearing 
                                                 
26 Ibid., p. 153 
27 Ibid. 
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of presence.28 The power of the pictorial metaphor is indicated in that other phrase, 
‘pure radiance’. And here we have to take seriously something new: the late 
Heidegger’s frequent attempts to consider ‘mystery-filled identity’, the not-yet 
unconcealed, the unsaid in the unsayable, some oneness prior to even the open of 
aletheia. 
It seems possible to see the birds in Braque’s Studio paintings, such as Studio 
II, (1949) as forms, shapes, woven into the fabric of things and space. The nature of 
the process of making here is not of course identical to Cézanne’s, but it shares in that 
poetic saying that makes the saying itself the meaning, that allows perhaps for a 
‘realization and overcoming’ of what is otherwise experienced in thinking only as the 
twofold truth of unconcealedness into pure radiance, a mystery-filled identity. 
But would we say the same, or think it plausible to say it, when confronting the 
birding of the birds of Braque’s later aerial fantasies, those to be found in the prints of 
L’ordre des oiseaux and in related paintings such as The Birds (1954-6)? Could the 
rhetoric of a ‘mystery-filled identity’ here be construed, from Heidegger’s position, 
merely as Rilke’s Open? And if so, perhaps Braque’s thick impasto, his muted surfaces 
are there to insist on the painted saying of the Open, which acknowledges the idea of 
the creature, rather than the questioning of representation through representation, as 
central to the project of our own renewal in the crisis of modernity. 
In this chapter, a fine example of the art book tradition, or that sub-species of it 
that involves collaboration and inter-medial exchange or dialogue, has been set against 
the complex argument that Heidegger has with Rilke’s poetry. In approaching 
Oiseaux/L’ordre des oiseaux this way, I have taken seriously its subject matter as well 
                                                 
28 Medium here of course means many things: skeins of materialised colour; the hesitant attending and mark making 
of the artist; the inheritance of tradition where the relationship to it is constitutive of the meaning of the new 
procedure. 
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as its form, and examined where finally we should situate what seems to be, in the last 
analysis, a shared vaunting of the creaturely over the human, between poet and painter. 
I cannot say that the question of the validity, or one might say the ethical weight, of the 
book can be determined. What does seem obvious is that there is a tension between the 
romantic, even Schopenhaurean elevation of the closeness of creatures to creation and 
Heidegger’s emphatically human perspective. Braque’s prints, in their abstraction, 
draw upon his long apprenticeship as a modernist artist, taking to task the language of 
pictorial representation through an ever-greater concentration on its forms. His late 
adoption of the bird motif and increasing focus on its life-world meanwhile suggests 
that the testing of space and of things is diverted into a symbolic image. Such wheeling 
birds as those on the ceiling of the Louvre, for all their bold energy, inevitably seem 
dated, and this fading glory is caused by the redundancy or speciousness of the 
symbolism. I have argued that it is this weakness that Heidegger’s terse rejection of 
Rilke allows us to grasp. 
 
